Six Flags Over Georgia Goliath Incident (12-Oct-2026)

[Lucky_3838]

Am I understanding correctly? As I say, I’m not an engineer by any means, so please correct me if I’m spouting rubbish!

Thanks both for taking the time to read it!

Matt, the force scaling makes sense for that simplified, purely upward loading example. The part I'd be careful with is turning it into a body weight needed to break the restraint. The 4.66 kN is where a calculated nominal stress in one sampled pawl section reaches an assumed yield strength of 355 MPa. It isn't an established breaking load for the real assembly, so it doesn't give us a minimum rider weight that could cause failure. Upward loading during airtime is also only one way the bar can be loaded.

And bratcurry, assessing the locking paths doesn't cover every possible failure of the complete assembly, or establish the condition of any individual restraint. My study can't identify or exclude a cause of the incident. That's a separate question from what loads this reconstructed model carries under its stated assumptions.

Update: the clamshell study is now 67 pages

I got a bit carried away expanding this last night and ended up getting rather less sleep than planned But I've now worked through quite a few of the questions I still had about the mechanism and its loads, so there's a fairly substantial update to share, with new calculations, comparisons and diagrams.

The revised PDF is here: Read or download the full study.

Thanks again to Nicky for the CoasterStats recommendation. I went through their Mako recording and used the displayed motion readings to explore what forces they might imply for the seat and lap bar, with different assumptions about how the rider contacts both. These are forces calculated from the displayed readings, not measured forces on the restraint.

A few things came out of it:

• The timing matters. The recovered longitudinal and vertical minima occur 9.5 seconds apart. Combining those separate extremes would create a load vector that wasn't observed in the recovered record.
• The seat and bar can both be loaded during braking. The pad can push backwards and downwards on the rider while the rider pushes forwards and upwards on the bar. The seat remains loaded, so positive vertical loading doesn't automatically mean zero bar load.
• Direction and contact position matter. I've compared seven closing configurations and three assumed contact positions. The earlier purely upward result doesn't describe every combination of forces on the bar.

For an example, the most demanding selected comparison for an assumed 150 kg occupant gives a resultant bar force of 2.50 kN, against a 3.25 kN model threshold. This assumes seated braking, with the force directed 60 degrees above the forward horizontal and applied at the outer contact position. That angle describes the force direction, not the restraint's closing angle.

At an assumed 200 kg, the force becomes 3.34 kN, slightly above the same threshold. That threshold again marks the first included nominal section stress reaching the assumed yield strength, not a prediction of fracture or release. The masses are calculation inputs, not statements about who fits. The 3.25 kN also concerns a different direction and contact position from the earlier 4.66 kN upward reference.

One correction to my earlier video comment: its overview gives a longitudinal minimum of −1.50g, while the onride minimum indicator and confirmed readings give −0.85g. I've documented that disagreement rather than treating −1.50g as a recovered event.

The new analysis, diagrams and limitations are in Section 15. The original CAD reconstruction and mechanism study are still there too.

My overall impression of the clamshell's locking mechanism is very positive. From what I've been able to reconstruct, it looks like a well thought-out and mechanically robust arrangement. That is my assessment of the reconstructed mechanism, rather than verification of the real assembly's strength or the condition of any particular restraint.

Hopefully it gives anyone interested in the engineering a bit more to get their teeth into. Corrections and additional documented information are very welcome!

 

[SaiyanHajime]

Posting this video as further evidence to those that doubted it that there should be little to no gap between the restraint and seat's lateral supports... This video shows (screenshotted below) a restraint on the same coaster that has been allowed to operate beyond safe conditions, (no yellow line visible) and yet still, there's very little gap between restraint and seat...

This is the evidence that the restraint is not in a safe condition, and the train has been allowed to dispatch despite that... There should be a visual check line on the ratchet cover, as seen on the other restraints... To be clear, this is the same coaster, but not during the accident ride.

View attachment 43541

And this is what that unsafe restraint looks like...

View attachment 43542

The video these screens are from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-7p0YeJOz54

This suggests two things...

1) There have been times in the past where a train on the very same coaster was sent with a restraint in an unsafe condition... Indicating that in the past, the proximity sensors have either given false positives, or were calibrated incorrectly.

2) For those who still had their doubts, the restraint in the accident ORP was absolutely wide open.

To be very very clear, at the risk of repeating myself... This is NOT evidence that the restraint was sent in an unsafe condition during the accident ride, it is merely evidence that it is possible for that to happen, and that in fact, it has happened in the past... It's also further evidence, if any was needed, that the restraint was open and not in a safe locked condition in that ORP.

I think it is likely the visual lines staff are supposed to look for are a little bit extra than the sensor.

Because, going back to my original point pages ago - it shouldn't be possible for platform staff to **** up.

Platform staff - like all humans - will make mistakes. And it shouldn't be down to one person doing one thing to avoid an accident.

So I would put money on that bar still being in a safe position (3 clicks) and the ride system doing it's part correctly.

But that still doesn't make the evidence in the video any less damning. If it's a one off mistake that just happened to be caught on film, that's why the redundancy exists. If this is was happening often... Well that's shocking negligence. That's a management issue regarding training and monitoring.

The stars that need to align between...

The individual being over size, platform staff missing the marker, the sensor failing or have been tampered with to allow looser restraints, the ratchet then skipping at least 1, but likely 2 clicks mid ride.

It's still a lot.

The stars only have to align once for an accident... But yeah. It points to pretty astronomical levels of local neglect in maintaince and safety procedure following, that were still safe 99.9% of the time.

And yet it all seems more likely than a catastrophic failure. Which speaks volumes for the safety record, really.

 

[Nicky Borrill]

I think it is likely the visual lines staff are supposed to look for are a little bit extra than the sensor.

Because, going back to my original point pages ago - it shouldn't be possible for platform staff to **** up.

Platform staff - like all humans - will make mistakes. And it shouldn't be down to one person doing one thing to avoid an accident.

So I would put money on that bar still being in a safe position (3 clicks) and the ride system doing it's part correctly.

But that still doesn't make the evidence in the video any less damning. If it's a one off mistake that just happened to be caught on film, that's why the redundancy exists. If this is was happening often... Well that's shocking negligence. That's a management issue regarding training and monitoring.

The stars that need to align between...

The individual being over size, platform staff missing the marker, the sensor failing or have been tampered with to allow looser restraints, the ratchet then skipping at least 1, but likely 2 clicks mid ride.

It's still a lot.

The stars only have to align once for an accident... But yeah. It points to pretty astronomical levels of local neglect in maintaince and safety procedure following, that were still safe 99.9% of the time.

And yet it all seems more likely than a catastrophic failure. Which speaks volumes for the safety record, really.

It is, if you watch the video, the line merely acts as a 'redundancy' measure to the proximity sensor... Along with visual checks and the restraint push check. But that doesn't reduce it's importance.

We're at risk here, of relieving ride staff of all responsibility. Whilst I believe that we shouldn't be blaming any humans until there's evidence, and I absolutely agree that there should be the systems in place to prevent human error, no system is ever 100%, and ride staff have ultimate responsibility for guest safety. They're sometimes young yes, but they're working age people who are aware of what they're signing up to do, and with that role does come some responsibility for the safety of guests, or the role simply would not exist!

IF (and it's a big if) it turns out that this train was sent with a restraint in an unsafe condition, the ride host responsible for checking that restraint, will absolutely share some (note 'some') of the responsibility, regardless of age, they are employed to help keep people safe... UNLESS there are other mitigating circumstances, like they were directly instructed to ignore safety guidelines by a superior or were not properly trained themselves. Yes there should be systems in place to make it near impossible for them to make errors that lead to loss of life, yes there may be other factors at play, including some mechanical failure of some sort, but that's why I specifically say "share some." At the end of the day, they're always the last line of defense, that's exactly why they're employed.

This is what I meant by a classic Swiss cheese event earlier in the thread... The term is used a lot in accident investigations (well according to documentaries anyway,) as most accidents are just that, a series of many catastrophic errors combining to cause an accident, any single one of which avoided, would have prevented the entire accident.



So a 'hypothetical' theory for this accident that is a classic example of the Swiss cheese model is this:

1. Restraint is left too high for some reason or another.
2. Proximity Sensor incorrectly indicates a fully (3 clicks) locked restraint.
3. Ride host misses the first redundancy, the lack of a line visible on the restraint housing.
4. Ride host misses the next potential chance of catching this, the restraint push check (Not sure if they do this as policy at Six Flags parks?)
5. Ride host misses the final redundancy, the visual check of the gap between restraint and lateral support arm of seat.
6. Rider passes out applying unusual force to the partially locked restraint.
7. Restraint fails mechanically and opens enough to eject the rider.
   

I am NOT saying this is what happened, with the lack of evidence it's all still hypothetical. However it is plausible, given the information we now have, but still very much at best, highly speculative. I wouldn't be willing to bet on it.

 

[Nicky Borrill]

Thanks both for taking the time to read it!

Matt, the force scaling makes sense for that simplified, purely upward loading example. The part I'd be careful with is turning it into a body weight needed to break the restraint. The 4.66 kN is where a calculated nominal stress in one sampled pawl section reaches an assumed yield strength of 355 MPa. It isn't an established breaking load for the real assembly, so it doesn't give us a minimum rider weight that could cause failure. Upward loading during airtime is also only one way the bar can be loaded.

And bratcurry, assessing the locking paths doesn't cover every possible failure of the complete assembly, or establish the condition of any individual restraint. My study can't identify or exclude a cause of the incident. That's a separate question from what loads this reconstructed model carries under its stated assumptions.

Update: the clamshell study is now 67 pages

I got a bit carried away expanding this last night and ended up getting rather less sleep than planned But I've now worked through quite a few of the questions I still had about the mechanism and its loads, so there's a fairly substantial update to share, with new calculations, comparisons and diagrams.

The revised PDF is here: Read or download the full study.

Thanks again to Nicky for the CoasterStats recommendation. I went through their Mako recording and used the displayed motion readings to explore what forces they might imply for the seat and lap bar, with different assumptions about how the rider contacts both. These are forces calculated from the displayed readings, not measured forces on the restraint.

A few things came out of it:

• The timing matters. The recovered longitudinal and vertical minima occur 9.5 seconds apart. Combining those separate extremes would create a load vector that wasn't observed in the recovered record.
• The seat and bar can both be loaded during braking. The pad can push backwards and downwards on the rider while the rider pushes forwards and upwards on the bar. The seat remains loaded, so positive vertical loading doesn't automatically mean zero bar load.
• Direction and contact position matter. I've compared seven closing configurations and three assumed contact positions. The earlier purely upward result doesn't describe every combination of forces on the bar.

For an example, the most demanding selected comparison for an assumed 150 kg occupant gives a resultant bar force of 2.50 kN, against a 3.25 kN model threshold. This assumes seated braking, with the force directed 60 degrees above the forward horizontal and applied at the outer contact position. That angle describes the force direction, not the restraint's closing angle.

At an assumed 200 kg, the force becomes 3.34 kN, slightly above the same threshold. That threshold again marks the first included nominal section stress reaching the assumed yield strength, not a prediction of fracture or release. The masses are calculation inputs, not statements about who fits. The 3.25 kN also concerns a different direction and contact position from the earlier 4.66 kN upward reference.

One correction to my earlier video comment: its overview gives a longitudinal minimum of −1.50g, while the onride minimum indicator and confirmed readings give −0.85g. I've documented that disagreement rather than treating −1.50g as a recovered event.

The new analysis, diagrams and limitations are in Section 15. The original CAD reconstruction and mechanism study are still there too.

My overall impression of the clamshell's locking mechanism is very positive. From what I've been able to reconstruct, it looks like a well thought-out and mechanically robust arrangement. That is my assessment of the reconstructed mechanism, rather than verification of the real assembly's strength or the condition of any particular restraint.

Hopefully it gives anyone interested in the engineering a bit more to get their teeth into. Corrections and additional documented information are very welcome!

Hey I also did not fully understand everything in the document, but I still found it insightful. The 475kg figure really surprised me because I'd always thought that engineers worked to an absolute minimum safety factor of 3 when it comes to things like coaster restraints... But then I was reminded that the upward forces are a maximum of 1x or less on a B&M... I must have been thinking 1.2 - 1.8g for RMC, haha...

Anyway, that's not the point of my reply, if I've missed this info I apologize, but I assume your calculations are based on all pawls working together? Have you calculated the effect of a "1 click send?" The creator of that last video I posted found 2 different test seats he tried were indicating locked just before the second click!!!

 

[Lucky_3838]

Hey I also did not fully understand everything in the document, but I still found it insightful. The 475kg figure really surprised me because I'd always thought that engineers worked to an absolute minimum safety factor of 3 when it comes to things like coaster restraints... But then I was reminded that the upward forces are a maximum of 1x or less on a B&M... I must have been thinking 1.2 - 1.8g for RMC, haha...

Anyway, that's not the point of my reply, if I've missed this info I apologize, but I assume your calculations are based on all pawls working together? Have you calculated the effect of a "1 click send?" The creator of that last video I posted found 2 different test seats he tried were indicating locked just before the second click!!!

Thanks Nicky! I'm glad you found it useful. I did go fairly deep into the detail I wanted people to be able to check how I reached the results, but I'm happy to explain the main points here.

It doesn't assume that all four pawls take the load together. The calculation allows one side to start resisting the bar opening before the other side joins in. In the 4.66 kN example, the rear pawl on side B, labelled B3 in the drawings, is taking the opening load. It reaches the limit used in the calculation just as side A begins to help. So that number doesn't come from adding four pawls together, or assuming each side does half the work.

By that limit, I mean that the calculated stress reaches the assumed strength at which the steel would start to deform permanently. We don't know the actual steel specification, and this isn't a measured load that would break or open the real restraint.

Keeping the same assumptions and applying the force at the middle of the pad, the seven closing configurations in Table 14 give upward limits ranging from 4.66 to 8.24 kN. Different positions change where the parts meet and how the force passes through them. In the 8.24 kN example, the tube reaches its calculated limit first. Moving the force farther out along the pad also gives it more leverage: that brings the 4.66 kN example down to about 3.94 kN. So there isn't one number that describes every position and loading direction.

On the factor of three, I can't establish B&M's design safety factor from this study. That would need their design loads, actual materials and design criteria. For comparison, the recovered Mako airtime reading of about −0.84g gives roughly 1.24 kN upward for an assumed 150 kg rider. The most demanding upward-only comparison puts that against a 3.94 kN calculated limit, about 3.2 times the applied force. That's encouraging within the model, but I wouldn't call it a verified safety factor for the complete restraint. Braking can also load the bar, even while the seat is supporting the rider, so airtime isn't the whole picture.

For a bar closed only as far as its first audible click, I haven't established what load that exact state could support. I have looked at early locking positions, including the first reconstructed locking position on each side. But the two sides engage at different angles, so that pair of positions can't automatically be equated with one audible click from the whole bar.

And thanks for the video! I'll have a look

 

[lukpac]

Updated video from Ryan The Ride Mechanic, deeper dive into the locking mechanism:

Goliath restraint learning and failure part 2

No new updates but im thinking the restraint could have come undone on the Goliath ride like this.The Incident• The Victim: The deceased was identified as Ha...

www.youtube.com

 

[Nicky Borrill]

Updated video from Ryan The Ride Mechanic, deeper dive into the locking mechanism:

Goliath restraint learning and failure part 2

No new updates but im thinking the restraint could have come undone on the Goliath ride like this.The Incident• The Victim: The deceased was identified as Ha...

www.youtube.com

Only part way through so far... but if what he's saying is what happened, than that indeed is huge, and I was wrong, that absolutely could be seen as an actual design flaw needing rectification. In fact, if that would happen on the floorless model he worked on, surely it needs flagging to the manufacturer, or it's a ticking time bomb waiting for it to go unnoticed and occur on a live train.

Several comments in the comment section, like the one below, suggest this was a common occurrence too, so much so that some seemed to think it was normal operating procedure!!!

 

[Ebbelwoy]

Thanks Nicky! I'm glad you found it useful. I did go fairly deep into the detail I wanted people to be able to check how I reached the results, but I'm happy to explain the main points here.

It doesn't assume that all four pawls take the load together. The calculation allows one side to start resisting the bar opening before the other side joins in. In the 4.66 kN example, the rear pawl on side B, labelled B3 in the drawings, is taking the opening load. It reaches the limit used in the calculation just as side A begins to help. So that number doesn't come from adding four pawls together, or assuming each side does half the work.

By that limit, I mean that the calculated stress reaches the assumed strength at which the steel would start to deform permanently. We don't know the actual steel specification, and this isn't a measured load that would break or open the real restraint.

Keeping the same assumptions and applying the force at the middle of the pad, the seven closing configurations in Table 14 give upward limits ranging from 4.66 to 8.24 kN. Different positions change where the parts meet and how the force passes through them. In the 8.24 kN example, the tube reaches its calculated limit first. Moving the force farther out along the pad also gives it more leverage: that brings the 4.66 kN example down to about 3.94 kN. So there isn't one number that describes every position and loading direction.

On the factor of three, I can't establish B&M's design safety factor from this study. That would need their design loads, actual materials and design criteria. For comparison, the recovered Mako airtime reading of about −0.84g gives roughly 1.24 kN upward for an assumed 150 kg rider. The most demanding upward-only comparison puts that against a 3.94 kN calculated limit, about 3.2 times the applied force. That's encouraging within the model, but I wouldn't call it a verified safety factor for the complete restraint. Braking can also load the bar, even while the seat is supporting the rider, so airtime isn't the whole picture.

For a bar closed only as far as its first audible click, I haven't established what load that exact state could support. I have looked at early locking positions, including the first reconstructed locking position on each side. But the two sides engage at different angles, so that pair of positions can't automatically be equated with one audible click from the whole bar.

And thanks for the video! I'll have a look

I have read your paper and I’m amazed by the amount of work put into this and the amount of attention to detail that was considered.

Also the reconstruction of the mechanism was vey insightful.

One thing I noticed in the paper and in your replies is that you mention four pawls where as according to the pictures, technical drawings and ryantheridemechanic there should be four sets of two pawls, so eight in total, right?

And if the gauge of 1 pawl is 16mm the combined gauge of that set would be 32mm which would double the amount of load before reaching yield stress.

My assumption why the 2 pawls in one set are separate parts is that that one of them is shaped in a way to be able to interact with the opening mechanism and the other one being attached to it so they can both be moved by the opening lever together.

 

[GeminiOP03]

EP left Silverstar open every day. There is absolutely no chance that they or any other park knows the reason for this mortal incident. I understand that coasters with seatbelts reopened, but I cann't understand how you can open a B&M Hyper without seatbelts. If they say that their maintenance is perfect, they imply that this mortal incident must have occurred because of lack of the right maintenance, which is Impossible to say at this moment.

EP is my Home Park, and I am shocked at how Mack makes his decisions.

The incident appears like more a freak one off, than a need for change across the broad. Adding seatbelts after one freak incident is shortsighted and unnecessary. The odds of a restraint failure is astronomically unlikely. A seatbelt only situation (if the restraint did open) may save the riders life, but not without causing serious injury to a riders body from the rides forces and dynamic movements. I get they make people  feel safe, however, the current design is above and beyond safe.

Before anyone tries to use car seatbelt safety as their example, please do not. It's an apples and oranges situation.

And who says that maintnace caused this? I have no doubt that the maintenance of EP is stellar. Silverstar ran every day, how on earth can EP pinpoint it down on maintenance since day one?

One freak accident, on one coaster, that occurred only a single lap bar doesn't mean it needs seatbelts.

I'm sorry, it just doesn't.

I had no doubt about the safety at EP too, until this week! They clearly could not know on tuesday (or any other day) what caused this, but they decided to open Silverstar anyway.

They might just think, it was opened the last 24 years with exaktly the same maintenance as always and nothing happened, so why should we closed it now?

But what if thats exactly what SFOG did? What if in a few weeks we will find out, that maintenance did not cause this and that SFOG did nothing wrong? I am not saying that this will be the result, but it could be.

There is still an chance, that there is something wrong with the design of the restraint system, but Mack don't give a damn about that, as long as they do their maintnace as usual.

Why are angry with EP for not closing Silver Star? How do you know B&M didn't visit EP immediately after the accident and inspect the trains themselves?

Only part way through so far... but if what he's saying is what happened, than that indeed is huge, and I was wrong, that absolutely could be seen as an actual design flaw needing rectification. In fact, if that would happen on the floorless model he worked on, surely it needs flagging to the manufacturer, or it's a ticking time bomb waiting for it to go unnoticed and occur on a live train.

Several comments in the comment section, like the one below, suggest this was a common occurrence too, so much so that some seemed to think it was normal operating procedure!!!

View attachment 43546

Wait, are you being serious?

We're taking GP folklore and fairytale as facts.

Has it been confirmed that the victim indeed passed out mid-ride, and thus was leaning onto the restraint for a lot of the ride’s run time?

I wonder if sustained pressure + the regular ride G forces could have caused each locking pawl to slip. One at a time. This assumes there is excessive wear and tear on the parts in question, as well.

There's four levels of redundancy built into the design. It's not just a faulty paw.

 

[lukpac]

A seatbelt only situation (if the restraint did open) may save the riders life, but not without causing serious injury to a riders body from the rides forces and dynamic movements.

That's pretty unlikely, especially on a B&M hyper. Or most coasters out there for that matter.

 

[Lucky_3838]

I have read your paper and I’m amazed by the amount of work put into this and the amount of attention to detail that was considered.

Also the reconstruction of the mechanism was vey insightful.

One thing I noticed in the paper and in your replies is that you mention four pawls where as according to the pictures, technical drawings and ryantheridemechanic there should be four sets of two pawls, so eight in total, right?

And if the gauge of 1 pawl is 16mm the combined gauge of that set would be 32mm which would double the amount of load before reaching yield stress.

My assumption why the 2 pawls in one set are separate parts is that that one of them is shaped in a way to be able to interact with the opening mechanism and the other one being attached to it so they can both be moved by the opening lever together.

Thank you for reading it so carefully and for bringing this up! Between your comments, Ryan’s explanation in the new video and another look at C–C, the possibility of eight pawls arranged in four pairs definitely deserves a closer examination.

I actually wondered about that while reconstructing the drawing, but I couldn’t reliably separate all the overlapping profiles in the available images. I should have kept that uncertainty explicit rather than describing the four profiles I reconstructed as a confirmed count of the physical pawls. Sorry for being too definite about that in the paper.

The possible connection with the release mechanism is worth investigating too. Two parts could differ at the release end while retaining equivalent contact shapes at the teeth.

The thickness point could certainly matter. If two equivalent 16 mm pawls engage together and share the load equally, the nominal stress in each would be half that calculated with one carrying the whole load. I wouldn’t simply double the overall load figure, though, because we still need to establish that sharing, and another component could reach its criterion first. (For example, a preliminary equal-sharing calculation for the same reference upward-load case reaches the tube’s assumed nominal yield criterion at about 6.6 kN, before the pawls reach theirs.)

The next revision will revisit the axial arrangement, identify which profiles contact the sector at each position, and examine how the possible paired arrangement changes the load distribution and calculated thresholds. Where the images don’t let me settle something confidently, I’ll show the alternatives rather than quietly choose one.

So thank you for flagging it, and Ryan’s additional explanation is useful here as well.

 

[Nicky Borrill]

Wait, are you being serious?

We're taking GP folklore and fairytale as facts.

What are you talking about?

Nothing taken as fact whatsoever in that post... And even if it were, Ryan is hardly GP

 

[dontbesuchamcbr]

The incident appears like more a freak one off, than a need for change across the broad. Adding seatbelts after one freak incident is shortsighted and unnecessary. The odds of a restraint failure is astronomically unlikely. A seatbelt only situation (if the restraint did open) may save the riders life, but not without causing serious injury to a riders body from the rides forces and dynamic movements. I get they make people  feel safe, however, the current design is above and beyond safe.

Before anyone tries to use car seatbelt safety as their example, please do not. It's an apples and oranges situation.


One freak accident, on one coaster, that occurred only a single lap bar doesn't mean it needs seatbelts.

I'm sorry, it just doesn't.


Why are angry with EP for not closing Silver Star? How do you know B&M didn't visit EP immediately after the accident and inspect the trains themselves?

The difference is that I don't care what it seems to be or what most likely was the main contributor to this accident. The only thing I care about is whether all B&M hypercoasters are still safe to operate in the way they were built.

If B&M also offers this model with seat belts, then these seat belts shouldn't kill or injure riders when their lives depend on them. Nobody asked for car-like seat belts on a coaster, and most definitely, I never asked for extra seat belts on any coaster as a solution to this, because I have absolutely no idea what the problem was in the first place. So I don't even understand why you act like I asked for them.

And yes, you are right: I am mad at EP for opening SS only 11 hours after this accident. That is far too short a time to ensure that only factors within the parks' control contributed to this fatal accident.
Even if we assume that B&M was already in Atlanta and that the authorities let them immediately check the train and the restraints, instead of investigating them themselves (which is their Job!) and then letting B&M do their research, 11 hours is a very short time to reach a definitive conclusion about what went wrong. That is why I say that B&M could not possibly have ruled out every contributing factor outside the parks' control.

And just because it was a freak accident doesn't mean that all these rides will be safe for the next 20+ years without changing anything, or that nothing like this can happen again during that time.

And again, I am not saying that maintenance isn't a very likely cause of this. I am only saying that, so far, and definitely only 11 hours after the accident, we could not completely rule out other factors. And I am not one to take chances when it comes to amusement rides. EP sees this differently.
They say, “We’ve ruled out everything within our control, so the ride must be safe.”

 

[bratcurry]

With every new info coming out about B&Ms design my trust in them is further shattered. How the f can you add a safety net which needs constant adjustments to actually function as a safety net (prox sensors for Ops to control all needed clicks are actually engaged)?! How the f do you have a restraint locking mechanism which can easily be undermined with a little dirt?

Everyone who still calls B&M the gold standard for safety after all these revelations must be out of their mind.

 

[witchfinder]

A seatbelt only situation (if the restraint did open) may save the riders life, but not without causing serious injury to a riders body from the rides forces and dynamic movements. I get they make people  feel safe, however, the current design is above and beyond safe.

I suspect most people would take serious injury over, you know, dying

I don't think seatbelts negatively affect the ride experience on a B&M Hyper particularly, and I think they are inevitable on most of these rides (that don't already have them) after this incident, if only to make riders feel more safe.

 

[Matt N]

For clarity, how have we suddenly gone from “it’s probably a mechanical failure” and “B&M’s restraints would need thousands of pounds of force to open” to “B&M’s restraints are majorly flawed”?

This thread moves way too quickly for me!

 

[Nicky Borrill]

For clarity, how have we suddenly gone from “it’s probably a mechanical failure” and “B&M’s restraints would need thousands of pounds of force to open” to “B&M’s restraints are majorly flawed”?

This thread moves way too quickly for me!

We haven't gone from, or to, anything... These are all just theories, nothing is certain yet... Yes we have a bit more info, which allows us to bounce ideas and theories around, but the new info is hardly absolute fact, mostly hearsay still. So yes, at this point, any theories are still just that, highly speculative theories...

But to your points... There probably was some kind of mechanical failure... However, that doesn't necessarily mean there's anything wrong with the design, we don't know the reasons for any potential failure, it could have been caused by anything still at this point...

The restraints probably would still need thousands of pounds of force to open if fully locked... The good work done by Lucky shows that one pawl, just as the second pawl begins to assist, on one side takes around 475kg, that's almost 1050lb. Since it looks in the detailed drawings like there could well be 2 sides, possibly mirrored as a redundancy, it may still be 1000s of lbs of force...

We don't know if B&M's restraints are flawed yet... Some theories would suggest that, others not so much... But back to the original point, everything is still theory at this point.

 

[Callum]

Mako has reopened today!

 

[Matt N]

Another positive sign!

Do we know if they’ve made any changes?

 

[Matt N]

Sorry to double post, but from having scoured Reddit (so perhaps take it with a pinch of salt), it sounds as though Mako has reopened without seatbelts, for what it’s worth.

Perhaps this is premature conjecture on my part, but if there was known to be any hint of a design flaw with the clamshells themselves contributing to the incident, I feel like Mako would not have reopened without seatbelts. This is a somewhat promising sign, in my view!